Shared data-space coordination languages, which provide a mean to program interactions between decoupled entities abstracting away from their internal behavior, represent a powerful framework for programming network applications over the Internet and, in general, in open systems where the entities involved are not known a priori. In this context, where programs may run in untrusted environment, new challenges come into play such as to provide a mean to support security. In this paper we outline the most significant security threats emerging in this context and we present a survey, in a process algebraic setting, of the most interesting shared data-space coordination languages.
Introduction
New networking technologies are calling for the definition of models and languages adequate for the design and management of new classes of applications. Innovations are moving towards two directions. On the one hand, the Internet is the candidate environment for supporting the so-called wide area applications. On the other hand, smaller networks of mobile and portable devices, such as mobile ad-hoc networks or peer-to-peer systems, support applications based on entities or components which interact according to a dynamically reconfigurable communication structure. In both cases, the challenge is to develop applications without knowing, at design time, the overall structure of the system as well as the entities that will be involved. Indeed, these systems are usually open to new entities or components which are unknown beforehand.
Furthermore, our society is becoming more and more dependent on computer networks: the enormous amount of data that is elaborated, transmitted or stored needs some forms of protection. Hence, in order to guarantee some security properties, several procedures based on cryptography (see, e.g. [14] ) have been proposed in the literature. The goals of these protocols cover a large area of applications, e.g. privacy and authentication of the messages, personal identification, digital signatures, electronic money transfer, credit card transactions and many other critical applications. Actually, security protocols and the applications exploiting them are typically based according to a channel based topology.
Coordination models and languages, which advocate a distinct separation between the internal behaviour of the entities and their interaction, represent a promising approach for the development of applications for this class of dynamic and open systems. For instance, we assist to a renewed interest in data-driven coordination infrastructures originated by Linda [5] as exemplified by recent commercial products, such as JavaSpaces [15] and TSpaces [17] , which are two coordination middlewares for distributed Java [8] programming proposed by Sun Microsystem and IBM, respectively. Both proposals exploit the so-called generative communication [5] : a sender communicates with one or more receivers through a shared tuple space (TS for short), where emitted tuples are collected; a receiver can read or consume the tuples from the TS; a tuple generated by an agent has an independent existence in the tuple space until it is explicitly withdrawn by a receiver; in fact, after its insertion in TS, a tuple becomes equally accessible to all entities, but it is bound to none. This form of communication is referred to as generative communication because when a datum is produced, it has an existence which is independent of its producer, and it is equally accessible to all entities.
In this paper we outline the main security threats which occur when the Linda coordination model is used in untrusted environments. Then we classify the most interesting solutions available in the literature in two classes by proposing two abstract calculi which implement access control mechanisms in two different manners: entity-driven approach and knowledge-driven approach. Essentially, the former one exploits the notion of entity to express access permissions and to govern the accesses to the resources according with system capabilities, while the latter one uses some reserved information that are required when accessing the resources.
The paper in organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Linda calculus, Section 3 an overview of the security threats emerging when the Linda coordination model is exploited in open environments, Section 4 describes two possible approaches for dealing with security issues and Section 5 reports the most interesting actual proposals already available in the literature. Finally Section 6 concludes the paper with some final comments and by reporting related work.
The Linda coordination model
The coordination primitives that we have in Linda are: out(e), in(t) and rd(t). The output operation out(e) inserts a tuple e in the tuple space (TS for short). Primitive in(t) is the blocking input operation: when an occurrence of a tuple e matching with t (denoting a template) is found in the TS, it is removed from the TS and the primitive returns the tuple. The read primitive rd(t) is the blocking read operation that, differently from in(t), returns the matching tuple e without removing it from the TS. In literature a number of Lindabased languages [11, 12, 15] support multiple spaces, thus in the model we are going to describe, named LinCa, we enrich the syntax of the primitives with an additional paramater indicating the space where the operation is to be performed.
Linda tuples are ordered and finite sequences of typed fields, while template are ordered and finite sequences of fields that can be either actual or formal (see [4] ): a field is actual if it specifies a type and a value, whilst it is formal if the type only is given. For the sake of simplicity, in the formalization we are going to present fields are not typed.
Formally, let M ess, ranged over by m, m , . . ., be a denumerable set of messages and V ar, ranged over by x, y, . . ., be the set of data variables. In the following, we use x, y, . . ., to denote finite sequences x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x n of pairwise distinct variables.
Tuples, denoted by e, e , . . ., are finite and ordered sequences of data fields, whilst templates, denoted by t, t , . . ., are finite and ordered sequences of fields that can be either data or wildcards (used to match with any message).
Formally, tuples are defined as follows:
where d is a term of the following grammar:
The definition of template follows:
where dt is a term of the following grammar:
A data field d can be a message or a variable. The additional value null denotes the wildcard, whose meaning is the same of formal fields of Linda, i.e. it matches with any field value. In the following, the set T uple (resp. T emplate) denotes the set of tuples (resp. templates) containing no variable.
The matching rule between tuples and templates we consider is the classical one of Linda, whose definition is as follows.
Definition 2.1 Matching rule -Let e = d 1 ; d 2 ; . . . ; d n ∈ T uple be a tuple, t = dt 1 ; dt 2 ; . . . ; dt m ∈ T emplate be a template; we say that e matches t (denoted by e t) if the following conditions hold:
Condition 1. checks if e and t have the same arity, whilst 2. tests if each non-wildcard field of t is equal to the corresponding field of e.
Let Sp, ranged over by s, s , . . ., be the set of tuple space names. In the following, we denote with T S s the tuple space whose name is s. Processes, denoted by P , Q, . . ., are defined as follows: P , Q, . . . ::= processes 0 null process | out e@s.P output | rd t( x)@s.P read | in t( x)@s.P input | P P parallel composition | !P replication A process can be a terminated program 0, a prefix form µ.P , the parallel composition of two programs, or the replication of a program. The prefix µ can be one of the following coordination primitives: i) out e@s, that writes the tuple e in the T S s ; ii) rd t( x)@s, that given a template t reads a matching tuple e in the T S s and stores the return value in x; iii) in t( x)@s, that given a template t consumes a matching tuple e in the T S s and stores the return value in x. In both the rd t( x)@s and in t( x)@s operations ( x) is a binder for the variables in x. The parallel composition P Q of two processes P and Q behaves as two processes running in parallel, whilst the replication operator !P denotes the parallel composition of an unbounded number of copies of P .
We use P [d/x] to denote the process that behaves as P in which all occurrences of x are replaced with d. We also use P [ d/ x] to denote the process obtained by replacing in P all occurrences of variables in x with the corresponding value in d, i.e.
We also say that a process is closed if it has no free variable. In the following, we consider only processes that are closed and well formed; P rocess denotes the set of such processes.
Let DSpace, ranged over by DS, DS , . . ., be the set of possible configurations of the TSs, that is DSpace = {T S s | s ∈ Sp, T S s ∈ M f in (T uple)}, where M f in (S) denotes the set of all the possible finite multisets on S. The set System = {[P, DS] | P ∈ P rocess, DS ∈ DSpace}, ranged over by sys, sys , . . ., denotes the possible configurations of systems. Given sys = [P, DS] we assume that the indexes of the data-spaces in DS are all pairwise distinct.
The semantics we use to describe processes interacting via LinCa primitives is defined in terms of a transition system (System, −→), where →⊆ System × System. More precisely, −→ is the minimal relation satisfying the axioms and rules of Table 1 (symmetric rule of (4) is omitted). (sys, sys ) ∈−→ (also denoted by sys −→ sys ) means that a system sys can evolve (performing a single action) in the system sys . Table 1 Semantics of LinCa Axiom (1) describes the output operation that produces a new occurrence of the tuple e in the space T S s (T S s ⊕ e denotes the multiset obtained by T S s increasing by 1 the number of occurrences of e). Rules (2) and (3) describe the in and the rd operations, respectively: if a matching e tuple is currently available in the space T S s , it is returned at the process invoking the operation and, in the case of in, it is also removed from the space (T S s − e denotes the removal of an occurrence of e from the multiset T S s ). More precisely, the return value is indicated with Rv(e) which represents, in this case, the entire sequence of data fields in e. Rule (4) represents a local computation of processes, whilst (5) the replication operator that produces a new instance of the process and copies itself.
Security threath
Recent distributed applications such as Web services, applications for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), Peer to Peer Applications (P2P) are inherently open to processes, entities, components that are not known at design time.
When the Linda coordination model is exploited to program the coordination inside this class of applications (see e.g. [10] for Web services, Lime [11] in the context of MANETs and PeerSpaces [3] for P2P applications) new critical aspects come into play such as the need to deal with a hostile environment which may comprise also untrusted components. In this case an entity may enter the system and, according to the data-driven approach, can access the repository in order to read/remove data, as well as maliciously produce new data. More precisely, each entity, provided it can access the TS, can perform any primitive on the space. In particular, the main problem is that any agent can read/remove any tuple stored into the TS simply by exploiting formal fields, that acts as wildcards. For instance, any process is allowed to perform in null ( x)@s thus removing any tuple (which is nondeterministically selected) with one data field which is available in T S s . The threat in this case is that a malicious process can interfere with the entities which collaborate by using the space TS. As far as the output operation is concerned, it can be the cause of denial of service attacks in which a process maliciously overwhelms the tuple space with an enormous number of new tuples to be stored.
Example 3.1 Group communication -As an example of security threat, we consider the case of group communication realized through a shared dataspace. A group G has an associated set of producers and a set of consumers.
The producers can execute the operation sendT oGroup(G, d) to produce a datum d ∈ Data which becomes available to the consumers that can consume it by executing the operation consumeF romGroup(G, x). A trivial implementation of these two group communication primitives is based on the shared data-space T S s G used as a repository for the exchanged messages:
Since all processes can access the tuple space, also a malicious process could perform the same operations by: i) inserting new tuples which are not produced by producers in G, and ii) reading/consuming tuples which were intended for consumers in G. It is rather easy to see that there is no way to avoid such kind of attacks. In the following sections we propose, for each language supporting security features that we describe, a solution guaranteeing a secure group communication.
Linda with labels
The extension of Linda with labels we present is devoted to describe uniformly the several proposals for supporting some forms of security in Linda-based languages which allow us to prevent the threat explained in the previous section. This uniform presentation represents also the first attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to provide a taxonomy of the solutions adopted in the literature in order to add security to shared data-space coordination languages. In particular, such proposals follow two different approaches: i) the knowledge driven, and ii) the entity driven approaches.
The idea behind the knowledge driven approach is that resources (i.e. tuple spaces, tuples and single data fields) are decorated with additional reserved data information and the processes can access the resources only in the case they prove to keep the knowledge of such a reserved information. In the case of entity driven approach, instead, additional information associated to resources list the entities which are allowed to access the resources.
By comparing the two approaches we see that the knowledge driven one abstracts away from the entities involved in the system. Consequently, the entity driven approach is better suited when it is possible to know the whole set of entities involved in the system (e.g., within network where the access is limited to registered users) while in the opposite case, that is open environments, the knowledge driven approach is preferable.
Let Lab, ranged over by l, l , . . ., be the set of labels we use to describe access permissions and Operation = {out, rd, in}, ranged over by op, be the set of possible operations. Now we are interested in describing the idea at the basis of the mechanisms for managing system capabilities. In the following we will define the implementation of such labels used by the most interesting proposals available in the literature.
Labels are used to describe access permissions at the level of entire tuple space, tuple and data field. Formally, tuple spaces are associated with labels describing the permission which rule the access to the space; we denote with T S s [l] the space, identified by s, whose label is l. Tuples are now decorated with a label denoting the permissions which rule the access to the entire tuple and are syntactically expressed with e[l]. Finally, labels are associated also at the level of single data fields, the sequence of fields in a tuple is now defined as
The following subsections are devoted to formalize the Linda extensions supporting knowledge-driven and entity-driven access control mechanisms named KdLinCa and EdLinCa, respectively.
Knowledge-driven mechanisms
The knowledge driven approach is based on the idea that the process which is willing to perform an operation on a certain space must provide the necessary knowledge for accessing the space, the tuple and the single data field. To this end, we extend the primitives by adding a label which represents the knowledge allowing to access the space as follows: rd t( x)@s[l], out e@s[l] and in t( x)@s [l] where l represents such a knowledge. In the same way, we extend the structure of templates in order to describe the knowledge to access a certain tuple and the single data fields. In this case, templates are extended as the labelled tuples defined above. Let op ∈ Operation be an operation; in the following, abstracting away from the manner it is implemented, we use l op l as the relation espressing that the label l allows to access, by means of operation op, a resource labelled with l . In the following we describe how such a relation is defined in existing proposals.
The matching rule of labelled tuples and templates, whose definition follows, is a conservative extension of the standard one.
be a template and op ∈ {rd, in} be an operation; we say that e matches t when the operation op is performed (denoted by e K op t) if the conditions in Definition 2.1 and the following hold:
(1) lt op l. Table 2 Semantics of knowledge-driven mechanisms
The first condition verifies that the template has provided the right knowledge to access the tuple and the second one that the same holds for each labelled data fields.
The semantics of KdLinCa is defined as in Table 1 where the rules (1), (2) and (3) are replaced by the corresponding ones in Table 2 . Informally, the operations can be performed only if they provide the right knowledge to access the tuple space and, in the case of data-retrieval, the specific matching tuple. More precisely, out e@s[l] is performed provided that the label l satisfies the policy on output of l which is the space where it intends to insert the tuple. Besides testing the access permissions at the level of tuple space, the dataretrieval operations rd and in verify access permissions at the level of tuples and single fields according with the definition of
Finally, a remark about the return value Rv(e) of a data-retrieval operation accessing the entry e. In this case Rv(e) could contain not only data fields but also some labels available in e, thus obtaining dynamic privileges acquisition. In the following we will see how this is actually permitted in the languages based on knowledge-driven mechanisms.
Entity-driven mechanisms
The entity-driven mechanism is based on the idea that the access permissions (in this case by means of labels) somehow list the entities which are allowed to perform specific operations or to access certain tuples. To this end, the process description is enriched with an information indicating the identity of the entity executing the process. Formally let Id, ranged over by id, id , . . ., be the set of entity identifiers, the processes we consider are defined now by P E , Q E , . . . ::= id : P | P E P E where P is a standard process as defined in Section 2. id : P means that the entity identified by id is willing to execute P and P E Q E is used to express that different entities can execute processes. In a term P E we assume that the identities are pairwise distinct.
Let op ∈ Operation be an operation, in the following we use the relation id op l to denote whether the entity identifier id is allowed to access, during the operation op, the resourse labelled with l (obviously op = out has a meaning only in the case l is associated with a tuple space).
In the case of entity-driven mechanism the matching rule, whose definition follows, takes into account the identity of the entity in order to verify it possesses the right permissions.
Definition 4.2 Entity-driven matching rule -Let e = l 1 :
. . . ; dt m be a template, op ∈ {rd, in} be an operation and id ∈ Id be an entity identifier; we say that e matches t when op is performed by id (denoted by e E op,id t) if the conditions in Definition 2.1 and the following hold:
The first condition verifies that the entity identified by id has the right permission to access the tuple and the second one that the same holds for all data fields.
In order to support dynamic privileges acquisition we assume that privileges, as in the knowledge driven approach, are contained in the tuple space thus an entity can update its access permission by performing data-retrieval operations. We use the function upd(id, e, DS) to represent the new state of the data spaces after the access permission update for entity id when it reads/consumes the tuple e.
The semantics of the calculus based on an entity-driven mechanism is reported in Table 3 . The five rules are simple adaptations of the corresponding rules in Table 1 . Table 3 Semantics of entity-driven mechanisms
Linda-like languages for untrusted environments
The most interesting proposals of coordination languages supporting security in untrusted environments will be listed and described in this section as instantiations of KdLinCa and EdLinCa. More precisely, we will describe the labels content and their granularity and, when necessary, the return value of data-retrieval operations.
KLAIM
KLAIM [12] (Kernel Language for Agent Interaction and Mobility) is designed to program distributed applications that can interact using multiple tuple spaces and mobile code. The KLAIM operations basically are the same of Linda where in addition they allow the reference to a specific tuple space.
The basic element of the system is the location that is composed by a tuple space and a process. Locations are described by a term l : [P, T S] where l is a location while P and T S are, respectively, the process running at and the space contained in l. Systems consist of the parallel composition of locations.
The entity driven approach is used to control the accesses: locations in this case correspond to entity identifiers of EdLinCa thus tuple spaces as well as entities are identified by locations.
The access permissions KLAIM supports have a granularity at the level of tuple spaces. Moreover it does not allow dynamic privileges acquisition: capabilities are completely defined at design time. Access permissions, expressed in the EdLinCa abstract model by means of labels, are in this case sets associated to tuple spaces and describe, for each location, the allowed operations. Moreover, if a process is allowed to perform in operations it inherits also the permission to access the space with rd ones.
Formally let Loc, ranged over by loc, be the set of locations. The set of entity identifiers and tuple space names are respectively defined as Id := Loc and Sp := Loc, while the set of labels is defined as the set Lab := F p (Loc, P(Operations)) of the partial functions from locations to sets of operations. Given a label l that maps the location loc to the set of operations ao, denote with (loc → ao) ∈ l, this means that the processes running on the location l are allowed to perform on the space with location loc only the operations in ao. For instance, T S loc 1 [{(loc 2 → {rd, out}), (loc 3 → {in, out})}] means that processes running at location loc 2 can access T S loc 1 only by using rd and out operations, while processes running at loc 3 only by using in and out ones. We assume that there exists a special label in Lab, denoted by ⊥, that does not filter accesses to resources. Since KLAIM does not support labels at the level of single tuple and data field, we assume that tuples and data fields are associated to ⊥. Now we are ready to define the relation op , which verifies access control capabilities, and the function upd used to update access permissions.
Definition 5.1 ( op , upd) -Let loc ∈ Id, op ∈ Operation and l ∈ Lab be, respectively, an entity identifier, an operation and a label, loc op l holds if one of the following conditions hold:
• l = ⊥.
• ∃(loc → ao) ∈ l s.t. loc = loc and (op ∈ ao or (op = rd and in ∈ ao))
As there is no privileges acquisition, the funtion upd does not modify the dataspace, that is: upd(id, e, DS) = DS for all id ∈ Id, e ∈ T uple and DS ∈ DSpace.
The semantics of KLAIM is defined by the semantics of EdLinCa in Table 3 where Id, Lab, upd and op are the ones defined in the current section. The KLAIM model is also equipped with a type system which permits to verify whether a system behaves according with the capabilities. Types are used to express location capabilities, that is the capabilities associated to the processes running in that location. By exploiting these types, a static type-checking has been introduced for verifying whether the access permissions associated to the location where the processes run allow for the execution of the primitives declared by the processes.
Example 5.2 Secure group communication -We propose a secure solution to the problem of group communication described in Example 3.1.
The idea is that we use a certain location which contains the tuple space used to exchange data whose label allows: i) out operations for producers, and ii) in operations for consumers.
Let G be the name of the group, s G be the location which identifies the tuple space used by group G, P and C be the sets of locations (entity identifiers) of producers and consumers, respectively, and l := {(lp → {out}) | lp ∈ P } ∪ {(lc → {in}) | lc ∈ C} be the label associated to T S s G .
Let d ∈ Data be a datum, a producer can insert the datum d by using the function sendT oGroup(G, d) defined as follows (we omit to denote the ⊥ labels on tuples and data fields):
while a consumer can acquire and store data in x by using the function consumeF romGroup(G, x) defined as follows:
In this case the label associated to T S s G , l, guarantees that only producers can insert new tuples into the space and only consumers can consume that tuples. Indeed, a malicious process whose location (i.e. an entity) l ∈ P ∪ C cannot access the space.
Secure Lime
This proposal [9] introduces security mechanisms in Lime [11] (Linda in a Mobile Environment) at the implementation level. It is a secure implementation of Lime that provides a password-based access control mechanism at the level of tuples and tuple spaces. More precisely, the password-based system on tuple space and tuples permits the access only to the authorized processes, that is those that know the password. In particular, password-based access permissions on tuples can be associated to the rd and to the in operations while, at the level of tuple space, a single password can be used to limit the access to the space. In the case a process is allowed to remove a certain tuple (i.e. it knows the password associated to the removal operations), it has also the permission of reading that tuple.
We model such a solution by means of KdLinCa. Indeed, passwords are not associated to entities thus any entity which keeps a password, say pw, can access resources protected with pw. Let P asswd, ranged over by pw, be the set of passwords. The set of labels is, in this case, composed of two sets: one for labeling tuples (with rd and in modalities) and the second one for labeling tuple spaces. Formally, Lab := LabT uple ∪ LabT S where LabT uple := {(pw, pw ) | pw, pw ∈ P asswd} and LabT S := P asswd. (pw, pw ) ∈ LabT uple means that the tuple is protected with pw and pw for rd and in accesses, respectively. pw ∈ LabT S means that the tuple space is protected with password pw.
Obviously processes when performing an operation will use a single password which, in the case of data-retrieval, will be associated to the operation it is executing. We assume that there exists a special label, denoted by ⊥, whose meaning is that the resource is not protected; since the language does not support labels at the level of data fields, ⊥ will be associated to data fields. The definition of the op operator and of the return value follows.
Definition 5.3 ( op , Rv) -Let pw, l ∈ Lab be two labels, op ∈ Op be an operation, we say that pw op l if one of the following conditions holds:
• l = (pw 1 , pw 2 ) ∈ LabT uple and (op = rd) and ((pw = pw 1 )or(pw = pw 2 )).
• l = (pw 1 , pw 2 ) ∈ LabT uple and (op = in) and (pw = pw 2 ).
• l = pw ∈ LabT S and pw = pw .
Observe that, as in KLAIM, the first item ensures that the in capability implies also the rd capability. Let e[l] ∈ T uple, the return value is defined as Rv(e[l]) := e (i.e it does not return labels used to control the accesses).
The semantics of the secure version of Lime is defined by the semantics of KdLinCa in Table 2 where Lab, op and Rv are the ones defined in the current section.
Example 5.4 Secure group communication -A solution to the problem of secure group communication described in Example 3.1 is presented.
The idea is that we use a certain tuple space to exchange data whose access is protected by a password which is known only to the entities involved in the group.
Let G be the name of the group, T S s G be the tuple space used by group G and pw G be the password used to protect the access to T S s G . Let d ∈ Data be a datum, a producer can insert the datum d by using the function sendT oGroup(G, d) defined as follows (we omit ⊥ labels on tuples and data fields):
In this case, since only the entities in G hold pw G , only those ones can access the space T S s G [pw G ] and no malicious entities can access the space. We would like to point out that, differently from Example 5.2, in this language consumers can also insert new tuples as well as producers can also consume tuples. This directly follows by the fact that the password mechanism is symmetric: for instance when a producer protects a tuple it defines the password thus it can also consume that tuple.
SecOS
SecOS [16] follows the knowledge-driven approach thus we exploit KdLinCa to describe the language and its semantics. Labels, in this case named keys, are available in two kinds: i) symmetric, and ii) asymmetric keys. The former one essentially defines the match between keys as the result of the comparison while in the opposite case asymetric exploits the idea that there exists a relation which permits to verify whether a certain key is the co-key of another one. Such an approach is the well known one used in the field of cryprography where the public-key mechanism guarantees that given a key it is not possible to guess its co-key.
The access keys can be associated to either the tuples (object locks) or the single fields contained into tuples (field locks) since the model works on a single tuple space whose access is not restricted to anyone (consequently output operations are not controlled by means of labels). Data in the tuples can contain access key values, thus the shared space can be used to perform the distribution of access permissions. The mechanism used to control the accesses is the knowledge-driven one: keys are used to express access permissions and, in the case of symmetric keys, the same key is used to protect and access the information, while in the case of asymmetric keys it uses a pair of keys, one to protect and another one to access.
Let Key, ranged over by k, be the set of symmetric keys, and AKey, ranged over by k a , be the set of asymmetric keys. We define · : AKey → AKey as the function that, given an asymmetric key, returns the corresponding co-key and such that k = k. For the sake of simplicity, we extend such a definition also for symmetric keys where the function · is the identity one. Since SecOS uses only one unprotected tuple space, we assume that there exists a special value, denoted with ⊥, which we use to label the tuple spaces as well as that all operations use ⊥ as label for accessing the space.
In the case of SecOS the set of labels of KdLinCa is defined as Lab := Key ∪ AKey. The definition of the relation op between labels and of the return value follows.
Definition 5.5 ( op , Rv) -Let k, k ∈ Lab be two access keys, op ∈ Op be an operation, we say that k op k if k = k (for the sake of simplicity we are assuming that ⊥ = ⊥).
The return value of data-retrieval operations is defined as follows: Rv(e) := e for all tuples e ∈ T uple.
It is worth noting that op does not affect the definition of op . Indeed, the same access policy is associated to rd and in operations.
The semantics of SecOS is defined by the semantics of KdLinCa in Table 2 where Lab, op and Rv are the ones defined in the current section. It is worth noting that, since the return value contains both labels and data fields, SecOS allows for dynamic privileges acquisition and that, since the space is not protected by labels, output operations cannot be controlled thus losing the possibility to avoid denial of service attacks. The idea is to exploit an asymmetric key, that we use to protect tuples, which is known only to the producers while the consumers are the only ones which hold the corresponding co-key. In this way such tuples can be inserted and consumed only by producers and consumers, respectively.
Let G be the name of the group, kp G ∈ AKey be the asymmetric key used to protect the access to T S s G which is known only to the producers in G while its co-key, kp G = kc G , is known only to the consumers.
Let d ∈ Data be a datum, a producer can insert the datum d by using the function sendT oGroup(G, d) defined as follows (we omit ⊥ labels on tuple spaces and data fields and the reference to the single space available):
Besides guaranteeing that no malicious processes can insert or consume tuples used by the group, it is also guaranteed that receivers cannot insert new tuples as well as producers cannot consume available tuples.
SecSpaces
SecSpaces [7] follows the same idea introduced by SecOS. On one hand it refines the access permissions of SecOS by allowing to express different labels for rd and in operations (i.e. different access policies), on the other hand labels can be associated only at the level of tuple and not single data fields. Finally, the return value of a matching tuple does not contain labels, thus the only way to perform dynamic privileges acquisition is to insert labels within a data field.
Labels in SecSpaces are defined as Lab := LabT uple ∪ LabOp where LabT uple := {((k, ak) rd , (k , ak ) in ) | k, k ∈ Key, ak, ak ∈ AKey} and LabOp := {(k, ak) | k ∈ Key, ak ∈ AKey} (Key and AKey are the ones used to formalize SecOS which are defined in the previous section). Labels in LabT uple are used to protect tuples: ((k, ak) rd , (k , ak ) in ) ∈ LabT uple means that access permissions for rd and in are expressed by means of the pair (k, ak) and (k , ak ), respectively. Labels in LabOp are used when performing an operation, they are not associated to a specific operation because it is dynamically determined during the execution. Since also SecSpaces models a single unprotected space and does not support data field labels, we assume that there exists a special value, denoted by ⊥, which is associated to the space and to the data fields of tuples and templates.
LabT uple be two labels, op ∈ Op be an operation, we say that (k, ak) op ((k 1 , ak 1 ) rd , (k 2 , ak 2 ) in ) if one of the following conditions holds:
• (op = rd) and (k = k 1 ) and (ak = ak 1 ).
• (op = in) and (k = k 2 ) and (ak = ak 2 ).
In the special case the label used to protect is ⊥ we have that l op ⊥ for all l ∈ Lab used to access. In the remaining cases the relation does not hold.
Let e[l] ∈ T uple, the return value is defined as Rv(e[l]) := e (i.e it does not return labels used to control the accesses).
The semantics of SecSpaces is defined by the one of KdLinCa in Table 2 where Lab, op and Rv are the ones defined in the current section. It is worth noting that SecSpaces refines the access control policies of SecOS from the point of view of data-retrieval operations while the space is still not protected by labels, thus output operations cannot be controlled. The model is also equipped with a testing equivalence [2] which permits to formalize, and verify, some of the main security properties (e.g., secrecy, authentication). The idea to solve the problem is, in this case, similar to the one proposed by using SecOS in Example 5.6. An asymmetric key, which is known only to the producers, is used to protect tuples while the consumers are the only ones which hold the corresponding co-key.
Let kp G , kc G ∈ AKey and G defined as in Example 5.6, d ∈ Data be a datum, k ∈ Key ba a symmetric key, a producer can insert the datum d by using the function sendT oGroup(G, d) defined as follows (we omit ⊥ labels on tuple spaces and data fields and the reference to the single space available):
Besides guaranteeing the same properties of the solution based on SecOS, it is worth noting that here it is also possible to refine access permissions on dataretrieval by distinguishing between the processes allowed to consume and read the tuples. Such an extension can be obtained by using different asymmetric keys for rd and in modalities.
Conclusion and related work
In this paper we have outlined the main security threats occurring when the data-space coordination model is used in untrusted environments and presented a survey of the most interesting Linda-like languages supporting some forms of security policies. To this end we have exploited two meta-models, KdLinCa and EdLinCa, that describe the idea and the semantics of the access control mechanisms based on the knowledge-driven and the entity-driven approaches, respectively.
We have also proposed a secure solution to the problem of secure group communication in all languages we have discussed. Obviously, as emerge by their semantics and in some cases by the discussed example, there exist significant differences among such languages. For instance, by considering the proposals based on the knowledge-driven approach, the secure version of Lime is the only one which permits to control output operations, and SecSpaces is the only one which permits to distinguish between the processes that can consume and the processes that can read a certain tuple.
Finally, we list some related works which follow different approaches w.r.t. the ones used by EdLinCa and KdLinCa. Other two proposals, muKLAIM and Klava, are extensions of the KLAIM model. Differently from KLAIM, muK-LAIM [6] allows dynamic privileges acquisition. In particular, this can be done by performing in/rd operations with special template fields. While in KLAIM security policies do not change dynamically and then static type checking allows to test if running processes have the necessary access permissions to perform their operations, muKLAIM proposes a type system that evolves according to dynamic variations of security policies. The approach exploits a combination of static and dynamic type checking. In order to improve the system performance, the type inference rules perform a static type checking to those operations for which it is possible to statically test the presence of the necessary access permission.
Klava [1] is an extension of Klaim which exploits cryptography to allow only to authorized users the access to the specific information stored inside the tuples, but nothing is done to restrict the access to the tuples stored in the TS. In particular it introduces encrypted messages into the fields of the tuples and the matching rule allows the evaluation of messages encrypted into fields; the encryption of messages ensures that they can be read only by the allowed clients.
Finally, a different approach is proposed in [13] , where a general model for coordination middlewares that exploits process handlers to control the behaviour of processes has been presented. More precisely, a context is associated to each process and it defines which operations are allowed to the process. In order to express allowed actions, a language derived from CCS is used to describe which operations the processes can perform.
